Petitioner seeks discovery or record review. Nothing in the parties' email correspondences suggests otherwise. Sabbaghi's Motion at Exhibit A, Dkt. #17-2. Moreover, no federal or local

rule requires a party to announce its intention to file a motion for summary judgment. Thus, any

contention that Respondents' summary judgment motion is somehow improper is unfounded.

Respondents' Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for De Novo Review, or in the Alternative, Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment C08-1641-PET

27

28

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION
DISTRICT COURT SECTION
P.O. BOX 868, BEN FRANKLIN STATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20044
TELEPHONE: (202) 305-7171

As a threshold matter, Sabbaghi's intentions regarding this motion are unclear. Sabbaghi 1 filed his motion on the day dispositive motions were due, and he noted it for consideration on the fourth Friday after filing, in accordance with Western District of Washington's Local Civil Rule 7(d)(3) addressing dispositive motions. Sabbaghi did not caption his motion as a motion for summary judgment, however, and he failed to argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact or that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For those reasons, the motion does not appear to seek summary judgment. Although Sabbaghi responds to some of Respondents' summary judgment arguments, he did not caption his motion as a response or opposition to Respondents' motion. Instead, the caption Sabbaghi used -"Motion for De Novo Review of Naturalization Denial" - closely resembles that of his complaint, "Petition for Review of Final Naturalization Denial." Dkt. #1. With respect to this apparent redundancy, Respondents move to strike Sabbaghi's motion pursuant to Western District of Washington Local Civil Rule 7(g). If this Court decides to consider Sabbaghi's filing as a dispositive motion, Respondents' oppose such a motion; in the alternative, if this Court considers the motion as a response to Respondents' motion for summary judgment, Respondents seek to reply. II. ARGUMENT

Sabbaghi's claims that Respondents misstated the facts in this case and that there are still facts in dispute are unavailing.

1. Sabbaghi Fails to Establish Specific Facts Involving his Unlawful Harassment that Present a Genuine Issue for Trial

Sabbaghi continues to assert that the incident involving Dr. Aflatooni that resulted in the issuance of restraining orders against Sabbaghi was nothing more than a "business dispute."⁴ Sabbaghi's Motion at 4, line 24. Sabbaghi claims that "Respondents are trying to equate a civil restraining order with a criminal offense or arrest." Sabbaghi's Motion at 4, lines 22-23. On the contrary, Respondents, in their motion for summary judgment, accurately characterize

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

⁴ Sabbaghi's unsupported claim that an incident in which "both sides got civil restraining" orders" is a "situation that happens as norm in the State of Washington involving business civil disputes" is questionable at best. Sabbaghi's Motion at 6, lines 15-17.

Sabbaghi's actions, which resulted in the issuance of restraining orders, merely as "unlawful
acts" in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Respondents' Summary Judgment Motion at
10-11. "Unlawful acts," for purposes of the pertinent regulation, do not require actions to result
in criminal convictions, and Respondents never allege otherwise. Rather, unlawful acts, ask
described by that regulation, must only "adversely reflect upon the applicant's moral character."
8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Here, the Superior Court of Washington for King County found
that Sabbaghi committed unlawful harassment against Dr. Alfred Aflatooni. Certified
Administrative Record ("CAR") at 365-66. As a result, the Court issued Dr. Aflatooni an
antiharassment protection order under RCW 10.14.08(1), reissued that order and, later, issued a
full restraining order under RCW 10.14.08(4). CAR at 364-65, 374-75 379-80, 408-09. <u>Id.</u>
These events indisputably involve "acts" that are unquestionably "unlawful," which, given how
they threatened grave harm upon another person, adversely reflect on Sabbaghi's moral
character. ⁵

Sabbaghi's objection to certain statements included in the "Factual Background" section of Respondents' summary judgment motion – concerning the harassment issue – appears to be misplaced. Specifically, Sabbaghi denies lines 18-28 on Page 3; lines 1-10, 21-22, 24-25, and 28 on Page 4; and lines 1-10 on page 5 of Respondents' summary judgment motion. Sabbaghi's Motion at 4, lines 7-8, 15, 17, 18, 20; Sabbaghi's Motion at Exhibit B ("Exhibit B") at 3, lines 17-18, 25; 4, lines 2, 4, 12. The lines to which Sabbaghi refers, however, reflect nothing more than a recitation of answers Sabbaghi provided during his naturalization interviews.

nature.

Sabbaghi relies to no avail on an out-of-circuit case for the proposition that a naturalization denial cannot be based on a "civil action." Sabbaghi's Motion at 6, lines 10-11 (citing Nyari v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2009). In Nyari, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services refused to naturalize an applicant for failure to demonstrate good moral character due to the fact that his children had made a "founded sexual abuse allegation" that they later recanted. Nyari, 562 F.3d at 920-22. The Eighth Circuit, making no reference to what may constitute an "unlawful act" under 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), held that a mere allegation of sexual abuse was insufficient to establish a lack of good moral character. Id. at 921. Here, Dr. Aflatooni did not make a mere allegation of harassment against Sabbaghi; rather, a California Superior Court found that Sabbaghi committed unlawful harassment and issued several protection orders against him. CAR at 379-81; 386-89; 408-09; 464-65. Nyari is clearly distinguishable on its facts and does not suggest that an "unlawful act" must be criminal in

1	Re
2	cit
3	inc
4	int
5	pre
6	2.
7	
8	h
9	bu
10	LL
11	COI
12	ho
13	15
14	me
15	COI
16	(er
17	str
	Or
18	htt
19	Fo
20	rec
21	

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents' Summary Judgment motion at 3-5. Each answer described is accompanied by a citation to the interview transcriptions contained in the CAR. <u>Id.</u> Sabbaghi does not, and indeed, cannot, allege that Respondents incorrectly cite to the CAR, nor does he claim that interview transcripts in the CAR are inaccurate. Sabbaghi's objection, therefore, clearly fails to bresent a factual dispute, much less a dispute involving material facts.

2. Sabbaghi Fails to Establish Specific Facts Involving his Testimony Regarding his Business Dealings that Present a Genuine Issue for Trial

In his motion, Sabbaghi renews his claim that he did not believe that Mohanna, LLC was a business; this assertion continues to lacks credibility. Sabbaghi again "den[ies] that Mohanna LLC was a business or that any money was generated with this LLC . . . it was a shell corporation " Sabbaghi's Motion at 5, lines 3-5; Exhibit B at 4, lines 12-14. An LLC, however, is a Limited Liability Company, which is, by definition, a business. See RCW 15.15.005(5) ("Limited liability company agreement" means "any written agreement of the members, or any written statement of the sole member, as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business which is binding upon the member or members.") (emphasis added). Furthermore, Washington State specifically defines LLC's as business structures. See, e.g., Washington Secretary of State, Choosing the Structure of Your Business or Organization (July 13, 2009), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/corps/registration_structures.aspx. Additionally, the Certificate of Formation for Mohanna, LLC, refers to it as a business. CAR at 404. The documents in the record indicate that Sabbaghi is one of two managers of the LLC, which he incorporated on June 27, 2005, and which he operates out of his house. CAR at 355. Thus, Sabbaghi cannot support

3. Sabbaghi Fails to Establish Specific Facts Involving his Oath to Uphold the Constitution that Present a Genuine Issue for Trial

his claim that he does not believe that Mohanna is a business.

Sabbaghi also challenges Respondents' account of the oath he took during his naturalization interview; his version, however, is inconsistent with the facts on record. Sabbaghi claims that he only "slightly hesitated in responding to the question of the oath." Sabbaghi's

Motion at 5; Exhibit B at 4, line 21. However, the record clearly indicates that Sabbaghi did not

1	hesitate in answering "no" to the USCIS official's question, "If the law requires it, would you
2	bear arms against Iran?" CAR at 223, 357; Sabbaghi DVD Part 2 at minute 4.52-5.04.
3	Although Sabbaghi "den[ies] that [he] had to be prompted by my attorney" before responding
4	affirmatively to a question about his willingness to fight for the United States (Sabbaghi's
5	Motion at 5, line 25; 6, line 1), the record makes it clear that only after Sabbaghi's attorney
6	informed him that if he answered in the negative he "can't be a citizen" did Sabbaghi change his
7	response. CAR at 223, 357; Sabbaghi DVD Part 2 at minute 5.05-5.40. Furthermore, it is clear
8	from the record that Sabbaghi hesitated for over 20 seconds before answering "yes" - and, even
9	then, only after his attorney assured him that it is a standard question – to the question, "If the
10	law requires it, would you bear arms against fellow members of your religion? CAR at 223,
11	357; Sabbaghi DVD Part 2 at 5.52-6.25. As the video of Sabbaghi's naturalization interview
12	reflects, Sabbaghi's responses, both in content and in demeanor, cast serious doubt on his claim
13	that he would be sufficiently willing to obey laws and respect the democratic process. See In re
14	Pet. for Naturalization of Jorge Vivino Daniel Arbesu, 347 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (E.D. La. 1972)
15	(the question of attachment and favorable disposition requires ascertainment of the applicant's
16	state of mind, which can be fathomed only by the credibility of what he says).
17	III. CONCLUSION
18	Sabbaghi's motion fails to establish an issue of material fact or demonstrate why
19	Respondents are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, Respondents respectfully
20	request that this Court enter summary judgment in their favor.

21

22

23

24 25

26

27

1		
2	5	Respectfully submitted,
3 4		TONY WEST Assistant Attorney General United States Department of Justice Civil Division
5		J. MAX WEINTRAUB
6 7		Senior Litigation Counsel Office of Immigration Litigation
8		/s/ Stacey I. Voung
9		/s/ Stacey I. Young STACEY I. YOUNG
10		Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Civil Division
11		Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section
12		P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044
13		Tel.: (202) 305-7171 Facsimile: (202) 305-7000 Email: stacey.young@usdoj.gov
14		
15	5	ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
16	Dated: August 10, 2009	
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Case No. C08-01641-PET
3	
4	I hereby certify that on this 10th day of August, 2009, true and correct copies of
5	RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION PETITIONEwere served pursuant to the district court's ECF
6	system to the following ECF filer:
7	Bart Klein, Esq. Law Office of Bart Klein
8	Seattle, WA 98104
9	
10	/s/ Stacey I. Young STACEY I. YOUNG
11 12	Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Civil Division
13	Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section
14	P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044
15	Washington, D.C. 20044
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	